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Abstract–In open railway access markets, a train service provider (TSP) negotiates with an 
infrastructure provider (IP) for track access rights. This negotiation has been modeled by a 
multi-agent system (MAS) in which the IP and TSP are represented by separate software 
agents. One task of the IP agent is to generate feasible (and preferably optimal) track access 
rights, subject to the constraints submitted by the TSP agent. This paper formulates an 
IP-TSP transaction and proposes a branch-and-bound algorithm for the IP agent to identify 
the optimal track access rights. Empirical simulation results show that the model is able to 
emulate rational agent behaviors. The simulation results also show good consistency between 
timetables attained from the proposed methods and those derived by the scheduling principles 
adopted in practice. 
Index terms–Agent negotiation, branch-and-bound algorithm, railway open markets, track 
access rights. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Railway transportation is now facing stiff competition from road transportation. Since the 1950s, 
the rapid development of the road network in many countries has provided highly reliable and 
easily accessible infrastructures for automobiles. By contrast, similar growth in railways was largely 
hindered by the heavy regulations from governments [1], [2]. Price and service regulations were 
 2
originally imposed to protect the general interest of the community from excessive monopoly, but 
the continuous regulatory suppression has resulted in poor adaptability to the demand in railway 
services, leading to severe loss of market share to road transportation. However, in recent decades, a 
number of restructuring activities have been conducted in many countries through deregulations [2], 
[3]. Some of the monopolistic railways are now restructured into open railway markets, which 
supposedly encourage better quality of railway services to regain the lost market share. 
An open railway market, in its simplest form, consists of a group of train service providers 
(TSPs) and an independent infrastructure provider (IP). In the UK [4], the ancillary services of 
rolling stock and maintenance provisions are also separately offered by the rolling stock leasing 
providers (RSPs) and the maintenance service providers (MSPs) respectively. An open railway 
market therefore involves multiple stakeholders arranged as a supply-chain through which railway 
resources (e.g. track capacity and rolling stock) are supplied to the TSPs to allow ultimate train 
service provisions to the end-consumers. 
In order to operate trains on permanent ways, TSPs have to negotiate with the IP for a 
track-access-rights agreement. Unfortunately, in the absence of direct managerial authority over the 
TSPs, the IP faces two major concerns in its operation. Firstly, it is required to schedule train 
services of different operational characteristics (e.g. train types and maximum speeds), and there is 
even a possibility of several TSPs competing for overlapping routes [5]. While the rights-of-way 
assignment was then an internal trade-off exercise only for the IP in an integrated railway, the 
stakeholder is now a mediator for the operational differences among the TSPs. The second concern 
is on the disputes over the track access charge [6]. As the railway market becomes more competitive 
and commercialized, the TSPs are likely to minimize their expenditure on track access. The same 
applies to the IP whose objective may be dominated by revenue maximization. Consequently, a 
conflict on business objectives may exist between the two types of stakeholders, which results in 
difficulties in setting a mutually acceptable tariff. 
It is therefore beneficial to investigate various conflict resolution techniques between the 
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stakeholders so as to determine the best mechanism for allocating the track resource efficiently. 
Despite the successful attempts on post-evaluation of current practices [2], [7], [8], such approaches 
cannot be used to examine newly proposed practices without their actual implementation. Moreover, 
any physical change to a system is potentially risky and expensive. Pre-evaluation studies thus 
provide a safer and more cost-effective means for conducting the analysis. 
A modeling and simulation approach [9] has been proposed to represent open railway markets 
by multi-agent systems (MAS) [10]. This approach allows the assessment of various ‘what-if’ 
scenarios in open markets and examines different conflict resolution mechanisms between railway 
stakeholders. MAS-modeling has been employed because open markets are characterized by a set of 
interrelated constrained optimization problems that are distributed among the stakeholders. There 
are increasing MAS applications in solving this kind of distributed transportation problems 
[11]-[13]. MAS-modeling allows these problems to be encapsulated and solved by autonomous 
software programs called agents. However, these agents cannot accomplish their designated tasks 
without interacting (negotiating) with other agents. As a result, the open market MAS requires the 
local agent models in addition to some protocols for their interacting activities.  
A preliminary study [14] was conducted to employ a Buyer-and-Seller Behavior Protocol [15] 
for an IP-TSP transaction on track access rights. A TSP agent reasoning model [14] based on fuzzy 
logic was also devised. The protocol provides the necessary negotiation power for both agents so 
that the transaction is favorable to both parties. Moreover, when an offer is rejected by the TSP 
agent, the IP agent is allowed to explore alternatives satisfying the same requirements before 
conceding to other less preferable proposals. On the other hand, the reasoning capability of the TSP 
is modeled by the relaxation on a set of prioritized fuzzy constraints. This allows a variety of agent 
objectives (e.g. expenditure-reducing and passenger-oriented) to be constructed by the appropriate 
assignments of a set of numerical inputs. 
Nevertheless, the IP-TSP transaction is not complete without a proper IP agent handling the 
timetable scheduling. In order to examine whether the MAS-model can indeed simulate realistic 
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behavior in an IP-TSP transaction, this paper devises a reasoning model for the IP agent using a 
Branch-and-Bound (BNB) algorithm. Section II defines an IP-TSP transaction problem for 
scheduling a single train on track in open railway markets. Section III proposes a BNB algorithm 
incorporating three procedures to reduce the computational demand. Section IV presents the 
simulation setup and results for analyzing the rationality of the IP agent in both single and multiple 
IP-TSP transactions. Section V describes the practical issues in implementing the model in practice. 
Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section VI. 
 
II. IP-TSP TRANSACTION 
An IP-TSP transaction is regarded as a one-to-one (bilateral) negotiation on a product between a 
buyer and a seller [14]. The product under negotiation is the track access rights. The buyer of the 
track access rights is the TSP whereas the seller is the IP. Under this context, negotiation is an 
iterative process in which the two stakeholders take turns to express their requirements on the 
product until a mutually acceptable agreement is reached, or one of them withdraws from the 
process. There are four components in an IP-TSP transaction, and they are described and defined 
below.  
A. Track Access Rights 
Track access rights specify the conditions for track usage by a TSP. They consist of a schedule 
describing the train movement in space and time. Owing to different engineering specifications such 
as gauge widths and energy consumption, track access rights also identify the type of rolling stocks 
to be operated on the rails. In addition, during the negotiation, a parameter called flex is established 
in some countries (e.g. the UK) to denote the time flexibility that the IP can revise the train schedule 
when track or station capacity becomes scarce. Flex may be defined by a set of discrete levels 
where the lowest and highest levels refer to the minimum (0 min) and maximum (e.g. 10 mins) 
flexibilities to shift a schedule profile respectively. The TSP also has to agree on a payment of track 
access charge (TAC) in order to obtain the permission of train operation.  
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Track access rights P  is defined in (1), where }...,,2,1{ c  is the TAC (in $ or other 
currencies);   is the train schedule defined in (2); }...,,1|{  nii   is the rolling stock 
selected for operation and }...,,1|{  nii   is the chosen flex level. 
 ,,,  cP  (1) 
A train schedule   consists of a set of IDs }...,,1|{ si nisS   identifying the sequence of 
visiting stations. The movement of a train in time is described by the service commencement time 
(i.e. the arrival time at the first station)   (in hh:mm), the dwell times at each stations 
}...,,1|{ siDD nitT   (in min), and the inter-station runtimes }1...,,1|{  siRR nitT  (in min) 
between adjacent stations. Hence,   is formally defined as a 4-duple in (2). 
 RD TTS ,,,   (2) 
B. Negotiation Protocol 
One approach to classify various types of negotiation is by the number of parties involved [15]. 
Negotiation is referred to as multilateral when there are more than two parties in the bargaining 
process. When only two agents are involved, the negotiation is bilateral. In either case, a protocol is 
required to specify the actions available to the parties during their communication. The following 
protocols have been considered in modeling the bilateral IP-TSP transactions. 
1) Contract Net Protocol (CNP): CNP [16] is widely used in agent negotiation. This protocol 
provides a simple yet robust communication procedure to allow an agent to sell a product to an 
appropriate buyer agent in a distributed system. At the beginning, the seller sends a request-for-bid 
(RFB) message to the potential buyers in order to seek for the desired product. This message 
contains a user-specific description of the product and a deadline for receiving the replies. Upon the 
arrival of the RFB message, the buyers construct their individual bids and submit (PROPOSE) them 
to the company. After evaluating the received bids, the seller may award (ACCEPT) the contract to 
the most acceptable bidder, or refine the requirements on the product and initiate another RFB 
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message. The buyer that has been awarded the bid is required to send a confirmation message 
(INFORM) to secure the contract. The process is summarized in Fig. 1. 
CNP is usually applied to multilateral negotiation, where the seller agent broadcasts the RFB 
messages to multiple buyers. However, if the seller targets the message to a specific buyer, the 
negotiation is reduced to bilateral.  
2) Buyer-and-Seller Behavior Protocol (BSBP): This protocol is proposed in [15] to model a 
bilateral negotiation on a product possessing multiple attributes. The procedure is depicted in Fig. 2. 
Initially, the buyer agent expresses its partial requirements using a crisp constraint (inequality), 
which is enveloped in a FIND message. The message is sent to a specific seller agent whose 
responsibility is to generate a feasible offer and submit back via a CHECK reply. The offer is 
accepted (DEAL) if it satisfies the buyer’s reserved requirements and the buyer is willing to comply 
with the restrictions attached in the offer. Otherwise, the offer is rejected. In case of violations of the 
requirements, a FIND message enveloping a new additional constraint is supplied to the seller agent. 
In case of unacceptable restrictions, a REFIND message is sent to the seller to ask for a new offer 
while the original requirements remain.  
However, if no feasible offer can be generated in response to a FIND/REFIND request, a 
RELAX message is issued by the seller in order to prompt the buyer to modify one of the submitted 
constraints. The buyer may then revise its requirements with FIND or withdraw from the 
negotiation (FAIL). 
In CNP and BSBP, the negotiation power of the buyer resides in the possibility of refining its 
decisions so that it is not necessarily confined by the seller’s requirements. Similarly, the seller has 
the rights to make the best decision not according to the buyer’s responses and its internal benefits. 
This allows both agents to make concessions during the negotiation until their expectations coincide. 
Otherwise, the negotiation is terminated without any commitment made or deal reached. Despite the 
inability to model multilateral negotiation, BSBP has the advantage of allowing the seller to explore 
different alternatives under the same set of buyer’s requirements before making concessions. This is 
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particularly useful in an IP-TSP transaction where there often exist multiple track access rights that 
are equally favorable to the IP. For example, when the seller has two potential offers P  and P  , 
where P  helps the seller to collect a higher access charge than P  , P   may still be considered 
as favorable as P  if P   requires a lower capacity consumption. Despite the lower access charge 
collected, P   may allow the IP to utilize the track capacity more efficiently to support more 
frequent train services. Owing to its flexibility in negotiation, BSBP is employed in the IP-TSP 
transaction. 
C. Objective of TSP 
According to the BSBP protocol, the tasks of the TSP agent are to derive a set of crisp 
constraints on track access rights, and decide how to relax the constraints when making concessions. 
A prioritized fuzzy constraint satisfaction approach [15] has been devised to generate and select the 
required crisp constraints from a set of user-specified fuzzy constraints.  
The quality of the track access charge and train schedule times are modeled by a set of fuzzy 
membership functions ]1,0[)( ii x , mi ...,,1  and }...,,,...,,,,{ 111  RnRDnDi ttttcx  . A crisp 
constraint bii
a
i xxx   on an attribute ix  is denoted by the bounds aix  and bix . At the 
beginning of negotiation, the constraints are set at the most preferable values 
iii
x
i xxx
i
 },1)({argˆ  . A reduction of aix  or an increase in bix  corresponds to a concession on 
the attribute. Moreover, a priority value ]1,0[i , mi ...,,1  is associated with each attribute to 
indicate their relative importance to the TSP. Given an offer P  received from the IP agent, the 
acceptability of the product is defined by (3). 
  





]1)([
)(max
1min)(
1
1
ii
j
mj
i
mi
xP 
 , }...,,,...,,,,{ 111  RnRDnDi ttttcx   (3) 
Rolling stock and flex are modeled as restrictions imposed by the IP agent. If the TSP agent is 
not satisfied with the imposed restrictions attached with the offer, the IP may be requested to 
suggest an alternative. The TSP agent determines whether it can comply with the restrictions by two 
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sets of fuzzy values }...,,1|{  nifF i  , ]1,0[if  and }...,,1|{  nifF i  , ]1,0[if , 
which indicate the degree of obedience to the rolling stock and flex respectively. The overall 
obedience level of P  is defined by (4): 
 },min{),( ''  ff   (4) 
The objective of the TSP agent is to maximize the satisfaction on track access rights, subject to 
(5), where ]1,0[  is the accepting threshold to denote the minimum target satisfaction. 0  
gives the highest possibility for successful negotiation because the TSP agent may concede over the 
entire range specified by the fuzzy membership functions. On the other hand, when 1 , the TSP 
agent will only accept the most preferable schedule defined by the user. 
      ),(),(min X  (5) 
By employing the above TSP-model, the decision on accepting/rejecting an offer is not only 
subject to the quality of the schedule times and the level track access charge, but also to the 
restrictions on flex level and rolling stock. The use of an accepting threshold also guarantees a 
target level of satisfaction if an agreement is reached. 
D. Objective of IP 
The objective of the IP is to maximize the overall track capacity utilization and revenue 
collection from all TSPs. The utility function used by the IP agent in a single IP-TSP transaction is 
given in (6), where U  is the utility value (in $) of the transaction from the perspective of the IP 
agent, c  is the track access charge (in $); w  is the unit valuation of capacity consumption (in $) 
and   is the capacity consumed by the train service (no unit). The term  w  implies a 
minimization of capacity usage by the TSP’s train service. The essence is that if the capacity 
allocated in a negotiation is minimized, the available capacity remained will be maximized, 
allowing the IP to negotiate more deals at later stages. 
  wcUmax  (6) 
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This problem is subject to the constraint set   composing of,  
i) basic domains of variables: c }...,,2,1{  ,  }...,,2,1|{  nii  ,   
}...,,2,1|{  nii  ,  }59:23...,,00:00{ , Djt },...,2,1{  , Rkt },...,2,1{  , kj, . 
ii) submitted TSP requirements: ba ccc  , ba   , bDjDjaDj ttt  , bRkRkaRk ttt  , 
kj, ; and 
iii) headway requirements: dhh min , where minh  and dh  are the minimum and actual 
headway time respectively. In conventional train operation, the actual headway time refers to the 
time taken for a train to arrive at a certain point along a track (e.g. a station) after the train in front 
(leading train) has reached the same point. On the other hand, the minimum headway time is the 
total sum of the minimum braking time, reaction time of driver and equipment in response to a stop 
signal, and the time taken by the leading train to move by its train length. When the actual headway 
time is larger than the minimum headway time, the train behind is prevented from colliding to the 
rear of the leading train. These two terms are usually measured in seconds, but in order to maintain 
consistency with the resolution of schedule times, they are approximated by their ceiling values 
measured in minutes. 
TAC is derived from the sub-charges on track usage, traction energy, peak power demand and 
congestion. The derivations of these charges and capacity utilization are described as follows. 
1) Track Usage Charge (TUC): TUC recovers the costs of using the track facilities. The charge 
varies with the amount of maintenance required if the service is allowed to run on the track. A 
number of important factors for track maintenance have been identified [17]. They include the type 
of rolling stock, the number of vehicles or the weight of the train, and the maximum allowable 
speed of the train. In many railway systems, TUC is simply calculated on the total vehicle-kilometer 
traveled (for passenger services) or the total gross-ton-kilometer traveled (for freight services). The 
charge rates vary with different types of rolling stock and they are determined by simulation 
software (e.g. mini-MARPAS in the UK). Having adopted the current charging practice, TUC is 
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defined by (7) where 1c  is the charge rate (in $/veh·km) for rolling stock  ; vn  is the number 
of vehicles of  ; iL  is the length of track (in km) in inter-station run i . 
  

1
1
1
sn
i
iv LncTUC
  (7) 
In an IP-TSP transaction, it is assumed that the available types of rolling stock are commonly 
known by both agents. Each type of rolling stock has a predefined number of vehicles and length. 
The charge rates are predetermined and are available to the IP agent only. 
2) Traction Energy Charge (TEC): A power utility company charges the IP according to the 
units of energy consumed and the peak demand (neglecting the charges to voltage regulation and 
current distortion due to harmonic effects). TEC is levied to recover the units of electricity 
consumed by a train service. If 2c  is the charge rate (in $/kWh) for the electricity provision and 
),( RitE   is the unit of energy consumed (in kWh) during inter-station run i  when rolling stock 
  completes inter-station run i  at Rit , TEC is computed by (8). 
  

1
1
2 ),(
sn
i
RitEcTEC   (8) 
For each type of rolling stock, the IP reserves a look-up table in which the energy consumption 
can be obtained according to its runtimes over a specific inter-station run. This table and the charge 
rate are available to the IP agent only. 
3) Peak Demand Charge (PDC): PDC denotes the second component of the electricity tariff. If 
3c  is the charge rate (in $/MW) for the increase in peak power demand at the substation and 
),(  P  is the increase in such demand (in MW) when rolling stock   is running at schedule 
 , PDC is calculated by (9). 
 ),(3  PcPDC  (9) 
A typical power-demand graph of a train is shown in Fig. 3. The maximum peak corresponds to 
the time when the train reaches a particular speed that consumes the highest power. Then, the train 
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continues to accelerate to its maximum allowable speed at which the power demand becomes 
relatively constant. At times, the train may be switched to coasting mode, during which the traction 
motors are turned off and no energy is consumed. Such a demand profile is simplified and modeled 
as a 5-tuple by (10), where 1t  is the time (in min) required for the train to accelerate from 
stationary to full speed; 2t  is time (in min) between the first instance of full speed to the instance 
of braking before the next station; 3t  is time (in min) required to brake from the maximum speed 
to a complete halt; 1P  is the maximum power demand attained (in MW) during 1t ; 2P  is the 
maximum demand (in MW) during 2t .  
 21321 ,,,, PPttt  (10) 
Unlike the derivation of energy consumption in TEC, the change in peak demand requires the 
information of the other train schedules. With the simplifications in (10), the peak demand is 
calculated by superpositioning the demand profiles from all existing scheduled services, as shown 
in Fig. 4. 
4) Congestion Charge (CGC): CGC is used to recover the expected costs that the IP is required 
to pay to the other TSPs when the network becomes congested. In UK, this charge is related to the 
expected reaction delay caused by the train service, which is modeled as an exponential function of 
capacity utilization [18]. Moreover, a TSP is entitled to receive a discount on CGC if it agrees on 
certain flex levels. If 4c  is the charge rate (in $/min) for the expected delay caused in the network; 
d  is the discount factor associated with flex  ; iA  is the track specific constant (in min) at 
section i ; i  is the resultant capacity utilization at section i , CGC is computed by (11): 
  

1
1
4 )exp(
sn
i
iiAdcCGC   (11) 
All the charging factors in (11) are exclusive to the IP agent only. Capacity utilization for a 
single inter-station run is defined in (12) and computed iteratively by (14) and (15).  
 12
5) Capacity Utilization (CPU): Capacity utilization is defined as the ratio of the time taken in 
operating a set of trains with their minimum headways to the time taken in traveling at their actual 
timetables [18]. Fig. 5 illustrates the capacity utilization for a single inter-station run i  within a 
timeframe iW  (e.g. 30 min). The timetable of a train j  is denoted by its departure time 
j
Pit  at 
station i  and arrival time jAit 1  at station 1i . Associated with each train is the minimum 
headway time minh  which includes the time for braking the train from maximum speed to a 
complete halt, the time taken for the rear of the front train to clear its length and a safety margin for 
the reaction time of drivers and equipment. minh  is represented by the thickness of the 
parallelograms. If these parallelograms are joined together by the vertices as shown in Fig. 5, the 
trains are operating at the minimum headway and niK  yields the minimum possible time (in min) 
spanned by the n  trains on the track along inter-station run i . Capacity utilization at inter-station 
run i  is thus defined in (12) and the cumulative capacity utilization of all inter-station runs is 
defined in (13). 
 
i
n
i
i W
K  (12) 
  



1
1
1
1
ss n
i
i
n
i
n
i WK  (13) 
n
iK  at a particular inter-station run i  may be evaluated iteratively for all trains as follows. In 
computing 2iK  for two consecutive trains, there are two possibilities as depicted in Fig. 6. Case (a) 
refers to the situation when the train behind is faster, and otherwise in case (b). Let *jRit  be the 
inter-station runtime for the slower service. In both cases, 2iK  can be computed by (14). 
 *min
2 2 jRii thK  , 



)(maxarg*
2,1
j
Ri
j
tj  (14) 
Fig. 7 shows the instance when an additional service is operated after the second train. 3iK  
now depends on the relative runtimes of the second and third trains. In fact, for all other services in 
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window iW , 
n
iK  can be computed iteratively by (15). 
 



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j
Ri
j
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i tthK
hK
K 1
min
min1                    j
Ri
j
Ri
j
Ri
j
Ri
tt
tt




1
1
 if
 if
, for 2j  (15) 
 
III. OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM 
A. Combinatorial Optimization  
The maximization of the utility function in (6) is combinatorial because the independent 
variables are all discrete as restricted by the constraint set  . The common deterministic 
techniques [19] in solving this kind of optimization problems are integer linear programming 
(integer-LP), dynamic programming (DP) and branch-and-bound (BNB) algorithm. However, 
unlike the problems in [20] and [21], integer-LP formulation is not suitable because (6) is nonlinear. 
While DP may handle nonlinearity, it has the limitation that a choice (state) selected for a decision 
(stage) should be independent to the choices made for subsequent decisions. Otherwise, the cost at 
the intermediate stages cannot be evaluated. Unfortunately, the underlying variables (i.e. 
RkDj tt ,,,,  ) in (6) are strongly dependent as observed from the definitions of the sub-charges of 
TAC and capacity utilization in (8), (9), (11), (14) and (15). As a result, DP is also not applicable to 
the IP optimization problem. 
A BNB algorithm is based on the idea of intelligently enumerating all the feasible points of a 
combinatorial optimization problem [19]. The solution space of the problem is partitioned into 
non-overlapping discrete subsets by branching. A subset generated by branching is represented as a 
node, which defines a relaxed problem to the original optimization one. Within a node, a bound (a 
numerical value) is calculated to indicate the best possible solution for its leaf nodes. By 
appropriately selecting the nodes for expansion, the optimal solution is constructed without 
exhaustively evaluating all instances. 
There are three rules for constructing a solution for a problem. First, if there is no solution to the 
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relaxed problem, there is no solution to the original problem. Second, if the solution to the relaxed 
problem is feasible, it is optimal for the original problem. Finally, if the solution to the relaxed 
problem is infeasible, the cost at that node provides a bound for its leaf nodes. Therefore, the 
requirements for resolution are to partition the solution space and to define the relaxed problem. 
The following subsection specifies a feasible BNB algorithm for the IP optimization problem. 
B. The Basic Branch-and-Bound Algorithm 
1) Partitioning the Solution Space: The sequence of branching follows the order of variables 
   1Dt 1Rt 2Dt ... 1sRnt sDnt . An example of a branching tree is illustrated 
in Fig. 8. This sequence has the advantage of chronological arrangement of the schedule times so 
that the arrival and departure times at stations can be computed at a node. The restrictions on flex 
and rolling stock are considered at the beginning to facilitate the reduction of computational 
demand (refer to section III C).  
2) Definition of the Relaxed Problem: This is defined as the optimization of (6) when a partial 
constraint set '  is considered. For example, when the tree is expanded to node M  in Fig. 8, 
the constraint set becomes 1{'   , 2  , 45:07 , 53 1  Dt , 151 Rt , 43 2  Dt , 
}2min h . The bound at a node is computed by the sum of maximizing the individual sub-charges 
and minimizing the capacity utilization subject to the associated constraints summarized in Table I. 
The maximum TUC is identified by comparing the products of  vnc1 . For TEC, since maximum 
energy consumption is achieved by the operation at the minimum inter-station runtimes, it 
corresponds to comparing the maximum energy consumption of the available rolling stock when 
employing the set of shortest runtimes. The maximum PDC is evaluated by exhaustively 
enumerating the total power demand of all the feasible schedules. CGC is maximal when the lowest 
available discount rate and the rolling stock with the longest cumulative inter-station runtimes (i.e. 
when congestion is most severe) are employed. The minimization of CPU is achieved with the 
rolling stock traveling with the shortest cumulative inter-station runtimes. 
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Fig. 9 shows the flowchart for the BNB algorithm. k  represents the current evaluating node. 
Initially, k  is set to 0, which is the root node of the search tree. This node is inserted in LIST  
which maintains the potential nodes generated in the algorithm. kˆ  and Uˆ  record the best node 
and the corresponding utility value found during the algorithm, which are set to null and zero 
respectively initially. The algorithm then adopts a depth-first search. If a node have a utility value 
smaller than the current best value, the node is declared ‘fathomed’ and the algorithm continues 
with the next node in LIST . Otherwise, the node will be evaluated for its feasibility. If the node is 
feasible, it is labeled ‘lived’. Since its utility value is greater than that of the current best node, kˆ  
and Uˆ  are updated. However, in case of identifying an infeasible solution (e.g. the root node), the 
node is declared ‘expand’. Since its leaf nodes may contain the optimal solution, they are generated 
and inserted in LIST . When all nodes have been evaluated, the best node is returned. If the best 
node exists, the offer on track access rights is proposed to the TSP via a CHECK message. 
Otherwise, a RELAX message is issued to the TSP. 
C. Computational Demand Reduction 
In the worst scenario, the computational complexity of a BNB algorithm is no better than an 
exhaustive search when all nodes are expanded. For the proposed algorithm, the complexity can be 
shown to be )( 2222 ss nR
n
D nnnnnO  , where )(max
1
Di
ni
D nn
s
  and )(max
11
Rj
nj
R nn
s 
 . In other 
words, the applicability of the algorithm is limited by the size of sn . In order to generate results 
within a reasonable time span, three procedures are incorporated into the basic algorithm to reduce 
the number of node evaluations, hence computational demand. 
1) Facilitation of the Most Preferable Schedule: To minimize the information revealed to the 
seller agent, the original BSBP only allows the buyer agent to submit one crisp constraint within a 
FIND message in each negotiation. If the same restriction is imposed to the IP optimization problem, 
the schedule times ( , Dit  and Rit ) will often be unbounded by the TSP, and the problem space is 
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then limited solely by the headway constraints. This sometimes leads to an overwhelming size of 
domains (Fig. 10) which significantly increases the number of node evaluations in the algorithm. 
In practice, it is natural for the TSP to express the most preferable schedule at the beginning of 
negotiation so that the IP may provide a feasible schedule in the proximity of its requirements. With 
this consideration, the efficiency of the algorithm may be improved by allowing the TSP agent to 
submit the most preferable schedule during the first round of negotiation (the submission of the 
TAC constraint is however, not compulsory). Not only does this reduce the number of node 
evaluations in the algorithm, but the transaction also requires fewer negotiation rounds since those 
used in submitting the individual constraints are now condensed to a single one. 
2) Pruning by Headway Constraints: Despite the facilitation of the most preferable schedule, 
when the TSP agent progressively relaxes the constraints during the negotiation, the problem space 
for the IP inflates accordingly. This often gives rise to substantial computational demand. 
Fig. 11 shows a special case, when the minimum inter-station runtime ( kMIRT ) at an 
inter-station run k  is greater than the maximum allowable runtime ( kMART ) governed by the 
headway constraints. In such case, the leaf nodes corresponding to the situation are all infeasible. If 
this condition can be detected prior to the expansion at the node, all leaf nodes can be pruned.  
Let kEDT  and kLDT  denotes the earliest and latest departure times at station k  respectively. 
These are computed by (16) and (17) using the lower and upper limits of the TSP constraints. 
  

k
i
a
Ri
a
Di
a
k ttEDT
1
)(  (16) 
  

k
i
b
Ri
b
Di
b
k ttLDT
1
)(  (17) 
Also, let jkEDT  be the earliest departure time and 
j
kLAT  be the latest arrival time at station 
k  imposed by the j -th existing schedule having arrival and departure times of jkAT  and 
j
kDT  
respectively, for k
j
kk LDTDTEDT  . jkEDT  and jkLAT  are then computed by (18) and (19) 
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according to the headway constraint. According to Fig. 11, kMART  is the maximum difference of 
the latest arrival time due to the )1( j -th service and the earliest departure time due to the j -th 
service. kMIRT  is imposed by the requirement of the TSP agent. A node can be pruned if 
kk MARTMIRTk  , . 
 minhDTEDT
j
k
j
k   (18) 
 minhATLAT
j
k
j
k   (19) 
.  }{max 11
j
k
j
k
j
k EDTLATMART    (20) 
 aRkk tMIRT   (21) 
3) Pruning by REFIND Message: Pruning is also possible when the IP agent receives a 
REFIND message in the previous round of negotiation. When this occurs, the TSP agent is 
requesting the IP to generate a new offer based on the previous set of constraints. As the constraint 
set remains unchanged, the TSP is in fact not satisfied with the restrictions imposed by the IP, that is 
  and/or  . In other words, all nodes that employ the same set of rolling stock and flex level can 
be eliminated from evaluation. Hence, if   and   are used as the first two branching parameters, 
the entire branch beneath this combination is not required for evaluation. 
 
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS 
A. Simulation Setup 
For all case studies given below, the number of stations is set to 4. There are 3 types of rolling 
stock and 5 flex levels available for negotiation. Table II shows the vehicle numbers and track usage 
charge rates of 3 different types of rolling stock, in addition to their relative traction requirements 
(i.e. energy and power consumptions). The charge rates reflect the degree of track damage incurred 
by the rolling stock. In Table III, the lowest level 1  represents no flexibility and each incremental 
level allows an addition of 2-minute flex time. In addition, the flex discount factors reduce CGC by 
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5% in each successive level. 
Ten case studies have been performed (Table IV). These simulations are carried out under the 
same track configuration consisting of 3 track sections that connect stations A, B, C and D (Table 
V). The track length for the middle section is comparatively long and the track specific constants 
for the first and third sections are higher in order to simulate long-distance service provisions 
between two cities. In cases 1 to 7, only one IP-TSP transaction is conducted in each case. These 
transactions serve the purposes of examining the ability of reaching rational agreements. The 
remaining 3 cases form a preliminary study on an IP agent handling multiple negotiations in a 
sequential manner. Each of these cases involves 10 IP-TSP transactions, in which the order of 
negotiations is randomly generated. 
The definitions of the TSP agents are shown in Tables VI and VII. Those in Table VI are used in 
cases 1 to 7 and they are all expenditure-reducing agents, which are reflected by their high priorities 
on cost. Agents in Table VII are employed in cases 8 to 10 and they possess various objectives 
including expenditure-reducing and passenger-oriented. Owing to the limitation in space, the 
detailed settings are not shown but the vital information and objectives are described in Table VII. 
Table VIII summarizes the definitions of five IP agents, which share a common initial traffic 
condition consisting two scheduled services I1 and I2 (Fig. 12), but differ by either their settings or 
the initial power distributions (Fig. 13). 
The agents are developed by a JAVA-based agent development toolkit called JADE (Java Agent 
DEvelopment) [22]. All simulations are conducted on a P4 1.6GHz PC and the simulation time is 
summarized in Table IX. The length of simulation depends on the computational complexity in 
generating the optimal solutions with each negotiation round, and the number of rounds required in 
each transaction. It can be seen that the majority of cases require less than 10 minutes to complete a 
transaction, and only three cases take more than an hour to reach an agreement. Simulation results 
of the track access agreements in cases 1 to 7 are depicted in Table X and the resultant timetables of 
cases 8 to 10 are shown in Table XI. 
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B. Results and Discussions 
1) Pareto-optimal Solutions: In case 1, TSP-A1 is set up to negotiate with IP-1. According to 
Fig. 12, the preferred schedule requested by the TSP (shown in Table VI) is not occupied by any 
train service. Despite the availability of capacity, the request is not granted to the TSP in the final 
agreement (Table X).  
To explain this observation, Fig. 14 is constructed to display a simplified search tree at the final 
round of negotiation. The accepted offer is located at node 146 whereas the preferred schedule is 
located at node 'N . In this search problem, any solution employing 1  to 3  results in the 
violation of the cost constraint ( 1650c ) imposed by the TSP agent. Therefore, schedules under 
nodes 1 to 3 are all infeasible. Similarly, the solution at node 134 (which differs from the final offer 
by the type of rolling stock) also exceeds the upper cost limit. The first feasible solution is in fact 
the optimal solution at node 146. With the adoption of 2 , the TAC is reduced to $1650 by the 
lower energy and power consumption.  
The preferred schedule contained in node 'N  is also a feasible solution. Since the schedule has 
a slightly longer inter-station runtime between station B and C, the TEC is reduced whereas the 
CGC is increased. As the change in TEC was greater than that in CGC, the overall TAC is settled at 
$1647. Despite the satisfaction of the cost constraint, its lower utility value is not justified for 
proposal to the TSP. 
The study demonstrates the process and its feasibility in reaching a Pareto-optimal 
(compromised) agreement. In a negotiation of several entities, a solution is Pareto-optimal if any 
deviations from this solution results in worse payoffs for at least one entity [23]. From the IP’s 
perspective, node 134 is preferred due to its higher utility value, but it is excluded by the TSP’s cost 
constraint. On the other hand, node 'N  is more favorable to the TSP in terms of the cheaper TACs, 
but it is not in the interest of the IP. The Pareto-optimal solution at node 146 is therefore achieved 
through the use of BSBP (for submitting constraints) and the identification of an optimal offer by 
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the BNB algorithm. 
2) Capacity Management: In cases 2 to 4, TSP-A2 is set up to perform a transaction with three 
IPs separately. Case 2 is the reference study, negotiating with IP-1. The capacity weighting used by 
IP-2 in case 3 is doubled, whereas a higher congestion charge rate is employed by IP-3 in case 4. 
These simulations are constructed to examine the effects of raising these settings on capacity 
utilization. 
According to Table X, apart from the difference in utility value, the track access agreements in 
cases 2 and 3 are identical. Apparently, the adoption of a higher capacity weighting carries no 
impact on the resulting schedule and capacity utilization. Moreover, when the negotiation processes 
are inspected in details, the sets of offers proposed during the negotiation in cases 2 and 3 are 
identical and the TSP agent’s behavior (i.e. the sequence of constraint relaxation) is unaffected by 
the choice of capacity weighting.  
In fact, to influence the TSP’s response, the protocol allows the IP to propose a different offer 
during the negotiation process. This may be achieved by any modification in values of TAC, 
schedule times, rolling stock or flex. However, since both cases employ the same set of charge rates, 
the TAC of a given set of schedule times and restrictions remains unchanged. According to (6), 
increasing the capacity weighting in case 3 only reduces the corresponding utility value U  of the 
schedules in case 2, thus the rankings of satisfaction of the solutions are preserved. In other words, 
the IP will generate the same set of offers to the TSP in these two cases. Consequently, the 
corresponding TSP behavior becomes identical. 
However, raising the congestion rate in case 4 does improve the capacity utilization. The use of 
a higher rate causes a more severe penalty on schedules having higher capacity consumption. As the 
expenditure-reducing TSP is unwilling to pay for an excessive increase in TAC, it settles for shorter 
inter-station runtimes, resulting in better capacity utilization. 
Therefore, better capacity management may be achieved by increasing the congestion rate. In 
most business transactions, the price of a product is often used to manipulate the level of demand. 
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By the same principle, when the intention of better capacity utilization is reflected on the TAC, the 
demand on capacity usage may be altered. On the other hand, adjusting the capacity weighting is 
unable to convey the same intention to the TSP agent. Although the result may suggest the 
elimination of the term  w  in (6), capacity weighting is still required when multiple 
schedules of equal TAC but different capacity utilization are present. In these situations, the 
schedule that consumes the least capacity is selected in negotiation.  
3) PDC Recovery: Cases 5 and 6 are constructed in such a way that the IP agents differ only by 
the initial power distributions. In case 5, when IP-4 has a constant power distribution, the TSP agent 
obtains the track access rights at $1653, of which $190 is the PDC. This is derived from the 49MW 
of peak demand (Fig. 15) when the service departs from station B at 08:09. As a consequence, a 
step decrease in peak demand is deliberately inserted slightly after 08:09 (at 08:11) in case 6. In this 
case, the first interstation runtime and dwell time at station B have been extended, leading to a 
cumulative delay of 2 minutes. This postpones the departure time at the station B to 08:11, where 
the decline in peak demand was located. The peak power is reduced to 43MW when the service 
departs from station A, which lowers the PDC to $130. 
Since the IP is negotiating with an expenditure-reducing TSP, the schedule time constraints are 
usually relaxed prior to the cost constraint. When the IP encounters this type of negotiating partner, 
it responds by identifying the existence of any schedule with a better premium. In case 6, a lower 
TAC is possible by a slight adjustment of the timetable, which reduces the peak demand. By 
satisfying the buyer’s demand, the likelihood of securing a transaction is increased. On the other 
hand, in case of negotiating with a TSP who does not permit deviations on schedule times, the IP 
will offer the original schedule in case 5. The higher burden on the cost of peak demand will then be 
transferred to the TSP. 
4) TUC Recovery: Cases 1 and 7 employ the same IP agent but different TSPs. In case 1, 
TSP-A1 is willing to accept rolling stock 2  and 3 , but TSP-A3 in case 7 has a more restrictive 
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demand on operating with 3  only. Despite the slight modification, there are significant variations 
in the resulting track access agreements.  
As 3  is more likely to induce damage to the rails, it has the highest track usage charge rate of 
$0.16/veh·km (Table II). This causes an increase in TUC from $113 to $338. Moreover, as 3  
demands more energy and power, the TEC and PDC also become higher. To reduce the burden of 
the overall rise in TAC, TSP-A3 accepts shorter runtimes to reduce the CGC. Nonetheless, there is 
still an overall increase in TAC to $1999 (compared to $1650 in case 1). 
Similar to PDC recovery, the IP is acting rationally to transfer the proper maintenance cost to 
the TSP. When the negotiating opponent is determined to employ a poor quality rolling stock, the IP 
increases the TAC so that the cost incurred on track maintenance is recovered.  
5) Multiple Bilateral Negotiations: Ten TSPs with different cost and schedule time 
requirements are set up to compete for capacity over 3 hours in cases 8 to 10. According to Table XI, 
apart from two train services, B2 and B7, the track access agreements vary when different 
negotiation sequences are employed. 
Several train services are worth inspecting. The schedule times for service B4, B5 and B6 are 
nearly identical in cases 8 and 9. The timing diagrams for these services in the two cases are shown 
in Fig. 16a. B4 departs from station A at 07:38 and it is overtaken by B5 at station B at 07:53. B6 
leaves station A approximately 10 minutes after B4 and it travels behind B5 throughout the journey. 
However, a marked difference occurs in case 10 (Fig. 16b), B4 departs from station A at 07:34 and 
the inter-station runtimes are longer. There is no overtaking of B4 by B5, which now operates 
behind B6. Without the leading effect from B5, B6 is able to operate with faster inter-station 
runtimes. 
The above result is a direct consequence of the negotiation order of TSP agents. The sequences 
in cases 8 to 10 are TSP-B }465{  , TSP-B }456{   and TSP-B }564{   
respectively. In the first two cases, the negotiation with TSP-B4 is conducted last. By the time 
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TSP-B4 has been served, the requested train capacity has already allocated to TSP-B5 and TSP-B6. 
TSP-B4 therefore needs to accept shorter inter-station runtimes and gives way to the faster service 
of TSP-B5 when it arrives at station B. When TSP-B4 is served first in case 10, the IP agent is able 
to satisfy its requirements on longer runtimes. The next services from TSP-B6 can also be 
scheduled with its preferred (short) runtimes because the two services are separated by sufficient 
distance. Nevertheless, as B6 gradually reduces the separation from B4 at the approach of station C, 
there remains inadequate capacity to allow B5 to operate between the two services. As a result, B5 
is postponed to run behind B6. 
Similarly, the negotiation order for TSP-B8, TSP-B9 and TSP-B10 in case 8 is 
TSP-B }1098{  , while TSP-B }1089{   is the order used in cases 9 to 10. In case 8, 
TSP-B8 is able to obtain an early commencing time when capacity is available. The allocation of 
capacity imposes more restrictions to TSP-B9, which needs to settle for small deviations in 
commencing time and runtimes. Although this only leaves a limited amount of capacity for 
TSP-B10 to operate its service between B9 and I2 (one of the initial services), it is still possible to 
operate the service tightly behind B9 owing to their similar runtime characteristics. In cases 9 and 
10, as the negotiation with TSP-B9 is conducted before TSP-B8, TSP-B9 can now obtain its 
required capacity, but the service of TSP-B8 has to be scheduled behind it. In addition, since both 
B8 and I2 are running with moderate runtimes, B10 cannot utilize the remaining capacity between 
the two services. Eventually, B10 is delayed so that it is operated after I2. 
The above results are in fact consistent with the timetables achieved by the scheduling 
principles adopted in practice. Experience suggests that if there are conflicts in rights-of-way 
between train services, the train considered first usually has an advantage. Train planners often 
exploit this by scheduling according to the priority of services. In this application, as trains are 
progressively scheduled, there are more constraints to be considered. The first TSP in the sequence 
is therefore more likely to obtain its preferred requirements. Conversely, when several trains have 
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already been allocated on the track, a competing TSP will probably need to compromise with less 
favorable schedules. In addition, when a TSP has its service postponed, there may be a chain effect 
to the later transactions. 
Another observation from the result is on scheduling non-homogenous traffic. From Fig. 17, 
sequencing TSP agents according to case 8 consumes the least track capacity, whereas that to case 
10 requires the highest capacity. In case 8, the better capacity utilization is achieved by first 
scheduling the moderate-speed train (B5), and then the faster (B6) and slower (B4) trains. By 
selecting the moderate case as a reference service, the compromise on homogeneity may be shared 
by the two extreme services. Otherwise, one particular TSP could have been overburdened, in 
which case the service might not be scheduled in the network. Furthermore, capacity is also 
improved by sequencing TSPs with similar servicing characteristics together (e.g. TSP-B9 and 
TSP-B10 in case 8). Conducting a transaction with considerably different train speeds (e.g. TSP-B8) 
between these TSPs will consume more capacity than required. 
 
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES 
According to the findings from the simulation, the software agents are able to reach a 
Pareto-optimal agreement. The IP agent is also capable of handling the available capacity and 
recovering the necessary costs. Despite the ability in exhibiting these rational behaviors, decisions 
made in practice are undoubtedly more complex than the model presented in this paper. For instance, 
in negotiating track access rights, stakeholders are likely to consider additional factors such as 
regulations imposed by the regulatory and safety authorities, transaction handling costs and 
economic forecasts [3], [24], [25]. It is therefore not our intention to replace the current 
human-to-human interactions with automated negotiation. However, with proper adaptation to a 
specific open railway market, the proposed model is expected to be a valuable tool to assist the 
planning of policy makers before the actual negotiation is conducted. 
For example, in systems where there is fierce competition among operators of passenger and 
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freight services at localized track sections (e.g. the West Coast Mainline in the UK), track capacity 
is often dominated by the regular passenger trains, and the ah hoc freight services find little room to 
obtain their required capacity. In these situations, the regulatory authority may request the IP to 
investigate a proper scheduling arrangement so that the operation of freight services is not 
jeopardized. The simulation tool may then be used to study the performance of any proposed 
policies on capacity utilization and quality of services, and their impacts on the cost recovery of the 
IP. 
Another possible application is the determination of a proper access pricing regime [6]. As the 
railway markets in different countries have adopted various pricing policies (e.g. posted pricing, 
negotiation and auction), it is sometime beneficial to examine whether a successful policy employed 
in one system is applicable to another one. This is because the transferability of practices depends 
heavily on the organization of rail markets and the local traffic demand. In these cases, the model 
presented in this paper should be modified to reflect the specific situation under investigation. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a MAS-model for an IP-TSP transaction in open railway access 
markets. With the aid of the negotiation protocol and the reasoning models for the IP and TSP 
agents, simulation of the negotiation activities has been made possible. In addition, results have 
shown that the behavior of the agents is rational, and the agents are competent to achieve their 
designated objectives. 
In particular, when the MAS-model is incorporated with the BSBP, simulation results have 
demonstrated the ability of the agents to arrive at a Pareto-optimal solution that is beneficial to both 
parties. By employing a prioritized fuzzy reasoning algorithm, the TSP agent is able to determine 
the sequence of constraint relaxations that minimizes the loss in making concessions. Using the 
BNB algorithm, the IP is also able to reflect the costs of track maintenance, peak power and traffic 
congestion on track access charge, so that the resultant schedules may recover the actual cost 
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imposed by the train services. The results on handling multiple bilateral negotiations by the IP also 
confirm the competitive advantage on the first-served TSP and the difficulties in scheduling 
non-homogenous traffic demand.  
Practical railway networks often have complex layouts consisting of multiple tracks and 
junctions. Despite the assumption of a linear structure presented in this paper, the model may still 
be adapted to resolve conflicts in negotiations involving complex structures. As multiple tracks and 
junctions can be considered as a collection of single-track sections, the allocation of track access 
rights may also be regarded as a set of negotiations on consecutive track sections. In addition, since 
it is usually the localized track sections that experience fierce competition for track access among a 
number of TSPs, the simulation tool for linear structures devised here is still useful for conducting a 
critical analysis in these regions prior to the physical implementation of a regulatory or operational 
adjustment. 
Nevertheless, the applicability of the presented model in large scale studies is restricted by the 
exponential growth of computational demand of the branch-and-bound algorithm. The performed 
cases studies involving four stations required a simulation time of 2 hours per transaction at 
maximum. The simulation tool has also examined a case involving 6 stations and 48 transactions. 
The average computation time was found to be one hour. Even though the simulation tool is not 
intended to be used for real-time scheduling and the order of simulation time (even in hours) is 
reasonable for small-scale studies, the computational complexity will eventually become a concern, 
especially for scheduling multiple track access rights in a complex network. The adoption of a 
heuristic algorithm (such as a genetic algorithm) and/or parallel computing is certainly a potential 
means to reduce the computation time. 
This paper also forms a foundation for further research in modeling railway open access markets 
by multi-agent systems. With the implementation of this core IP-TSP transaction, further research 
opportunities are twofold. First, studies may continue to model the negotiations occurring in open 
access markets. For instance, structural research may be undertaken to investigate different 
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strategies (e.g. first-come-first serve, highest potential TAC first, etc.) to sequence multiple 
negotiations so that objectives such as capacity utilization and cost recovery may be optimized. 
Another type of negotiation is the coordination of train schedules at interchange stations between 
services operated by different TSPs. By reducing the passenger transit time, TSPs expect to boost 
up passenger demand without jeopardizing the resource utilization cost (e.g. idle cost of rolling 
stock). On the other hand, the second direction of research may focus on improving the model on 
IP-TSP transaction. In addition, since the scheduling problem devised does not consider the details 
of platform layouts at stations, the platform scheduling algorithms suggested in studies [26], [27] 
may also be incorporated to enrich the capability of the IP agent. In addition, as the robustness of 
timetables in response to train delays [28] is an important attribute in railway scheduling, the IP 
agent model may also incorporate the objective of improving robustness during the negotiation 
process. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Contract Net Protocol (CNP). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Buyer-and-Seller Behavior Protocol (BSBP). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Typical traction power graph for three 
interstation runs. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Superposition of peak demand graphs. 
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Fig. 5. Illustration of capacity utilization. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Derivation of 2iK : (a) train behind is faster; (b) train behind is slower. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Derivation of 3iK : (a) train behind is faster; (b) train behind is slower. 
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Fig. 8. Illustration of BNB search tree. 
 
 
Fig. 9. A flowchart of the BNB algorithm for IP agent. 
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Fig. 10. Possible size of domain without specifying the most preferable schedule. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Condition for pruning using capacity constraints. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Committed train schedule prior to negotiation. 
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Fig. 13. Power distribution prior to negotiation. 
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Fig. 14. Simplified tree for final round for case 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Power distribution after negotiation (a) case 5; (b) case 6. 
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Fig. 16. Timing diagram for schedules of B4, B5 and B6 in (a) cases 8 and 9; (b) cases 10. 
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Fig. 17. Evolution of capacity utilization in cases 8 to 10. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE I 
OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR RELAXED PROBLEM 
Terms Objective function Constraints in '  
TUC }max{ 1  iv Lnc   Headway; rolling stock 
TEC }),(max{ 2 RitEc   Headway; rolling stock; interstation runtimes 
PDC }),(max{ 3  Pc  Headway; rolling stock; commencing time, dwell times, interstation runtimes 
CGC })exp(max{ 4  iiAdc   Headway; flex; rolling stock; interstation runtimes 
TAC )max(c  Cost 
CPU )min(   Headway; rolling stock; interstation runtimes  
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
DEFINITION OF ROLLING STOCK 
Type Vehicles Track usage charge Traction  
  rate 1c  ($/veh·km)  level 
1  10 0.04 Medium 
2  8 0.06 Low 
3  9 0.16 High 
 
TABLE III 
DEFINITION OF FLEX LEVELS 
Level Flex time (min) Discount factor 
1  0 1.00 
1  2 0.95 
1  4 0.90 
1  6 0.85 
1  8 0.80 
 
TABLE IV 
SIMULATION CASES 
Cases IP TSP 
1  IP-1 TSP-A1 
2 IP-1 TSP-A2 
3  IP-2 TSP-A2 
4 IP-3 TSP-A2 
5 IP-4 TSP-A1 
6 IP-5 TSP-A1 
7 IP-1 TSP-A3 
8 IP-1 TSP-B {8, 2, 9, 1, 5, 3, 6, 10, 4, 7} 
9 IP-1 TSP-B {6, 9, 1, 5, 8, 4, 2, 7, 10, 3} 
10 IP-1  TSP-B {9, 8, 4, 10, 6, 2, 1, 7, 3, 5} 
 
 
TABLE V 
TRACK AND STATION DATA 
Track Origin Destination Length Track specific  
 station station (km) constant (min) 
1 A B 20 1.2 
2 B C 200 1.0 
3 C D 15 1.1 
 
TABLE VI 
TSP-A DEFINITIONS 
Attribute TSP-A1 TSP-A2 TSP-A3 
ˆ  (hh:mm) 07:50 07:05 07:50 
DTˆ  (min) {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} 
RTˆ  (min) {10, 75, 9} {10, 75, 9} {10, 75, 9} 
cˆ  ($) 1600 1600 1600 
  1.0 1.0 1.0 
DT
  0.2 0.2 0.2 
RT
  0.2 0.2 0.2 
c  1.0 1.0 1.0 
1f  0.0 0.0 0.0 
2f  0.6 0.6 0.0 
3f  1.0 1.0 1.0 
1f  1.0 1.0 1.0 
2f  0.9 0.9 0.9 
3f  0.8 0.8 0.8 
4f  0.6 0.6 0.6 
5f  0.0 0.0 0.0 
  0.1 0.1 0.1 
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TABLE VII 
TSP-B DEFINITIONS 
Name Start time Cost Attribute(s) of top priority Runtime requirements 
 limits (min) limits ($) 
TSP-B1 [07:00 | 07:10] [1650 | 2300]  Dwell and run times between A and B Moderate 
TSP-B2 [07:05 | 07:15] [1900 | 2750]  All schedule times Short 
TSP-B3 [07:20 | 07:30] [1550 | 2500]  Cost Moderate 
TSP-B4 [07:30 | 07:40] [1600 | 2850]  All schedule times Long 
TSP-B5 [07:35 | 07:50] [1800 | 2600]  All schedule times Moderate 
TSP-B6 [07:45 | 07:50] [1500 | 2300]  Cost Short (between B and C) 
TSP-B7 [07:50 | 08:00] [1700 | 2500]  Dwell and run times between B and C Moderate 
TSP-B8 [08:00 | 08:20] [2000 | 2550]  All schedule times Moderate 
TSP-B9 [08:10 | 08:20] [1750 | 3100]  All schedule times Long 
TSP-B10 [08:15 | 08:30] [1850 | 2950]  Dwell and run times between C and D Long 
 
 
 
TABLE VIII 
IP DEFINITIONS 
Attribute IP-1 IP-2 IP-3 IP-4 IP-5 
w  ($) 5000 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
2c  ($/kWh) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
3c  ($/MW)  10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
4c  ($/min) 250 250 350 250 250 
Power model PD-1 PD-1 PD-1 PD-2 PD-3 
 
 
TABLE IX 
SIMULATION TIME PER TRANSACTION 
Time Range (min) Frequency 
1 – 10 30 
11 – 20 2 
21 – 30 0 
31 – 60 2 
60 – 120  2 
120+  1 
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TABLE X 
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CASES 1 TO 7: FINAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN IP AND TSP AGENTS 
Category Attribute Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
Track access   (hh:mm) 07:50 07:05 07:05 07:05 07:50 07:50 07:51 
rights DT  (min) {5, 5, 3, 3} {7, 6, 3, 3} {7, 6, 3, 3} {7, 7, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 6, 3, 3} {9, 9, 3, 3} 
 RT  (min) {10, 74, 9} {9, 72, 8} {9, 72, 8} {8, 72, 7} {9, 72, 8} {10, 73, 9} {8, 69, 7} 
 c  ($) 1650 1554 1554 1900 1744 1686 1999 
   2  2  2  2  2  2  3  
   4  4  4  4  4  4  4  
Breakdown U  ($) 1521 1463 1371 1827 1653 1567 1935 
of utility TUC  ($) 113 113 113 113 113 113 338 
value of IP TEC  ($) 561 567 567 567 567 564 671 
 PDC  ($) 95 0 0 0 190 130 120 
 CGC  ($) 881 875 875 1220 875 879 870 
   0.0256 0.0183 0.0183 0.0147 0.0183 0.0238 0.0128 
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TABLE XI 
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CASES 8 TO 10: COMMITTED TIMETABLES 
 TSP-B1 TSP-B2 TSP-B3 TSP-B4 TSP-B5 
 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case 10 
Arr. at A 07:05 07:05 07:05 07:05 07:05 07:05 07:20 07:20 07:20 07:30 07:30 07:30 07:35 07:35 07:44 
Dep. at A 07:12 07:12 07:12 07:08 07:08 07:08 07:25 07:25 07:25 07:38 07:38 07:34 07:40 07:40 07:51 
Arr. at B 07:20 07:20 07:20 07:14 07:14 07:14 07:35 07:33 07:34 07:46 07:46 07:45 07:48 07:48 07:59 
Dep. at B 07:25 07:26 07:25 07:17 07:17 07:17 07:40 07:38 07:39 07:55 07:55 07:50 07:53 07:53 08:06 
Arr. at C 08:35 08:35 08:36 08:22 08:22 08:22 08:51 08:49 08:50 09:05 09:06 09:06 09:03 09:03 09:18 
Dep. at C 08:38 08:38 08:39 08:25 08:25 08:25 08:54 08:52 08:53 09:08 09:09 09:10 09:06 09:06 09:21 
Arr. at D 08:46 08:46 08:49 08:31 08:31 08:31 09:02 09:01 09:02 09:16 09:17 09:21 09:13 09:13 09:28 
Dep. at D 08:49 08:49 08:52 08:34 08:34 08:34 09:05 09:04 09:05 09:19 09:20 09:25 09:16 09:16 09:31 
 TSP-B6 TSP-B7 TSP-B8 TSP-B9 TSP-B10 
 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case10 Case 8  Case 9 Case 10 
Arr. at A 07:45 07:45 07:45 07:50 07:50 07:50 08:00 08:08 08:08 08:12 08:10 08:10 08:15 08:29 08:26 
Dep. at A 07:49 07:49 07:49 07:55 07:55 07:55 08:05 08:15 08:15 08:15 08:13 08:13 08:18 08:32 08:29 
Arr. at B 07:57 07:58 07:58 08:03 08:03 08:03 08:13 08:23 08:22 08:21 08:19 08:19 08:25 08:38 08:35 
Dep. at B 08:01 08:03 08:05 08:08 08:08 08:08 08:18 08:28 08:27 08:24 08:22 08:22 08:28 08:42 08:39 
Arr. at C 09:10 09:11 09:10 09:24 09:24 09:24 09:28 09:37 09:36 09:30 09:27 09:27 09:33 09:48 09:45 
Dep. at C 09:13 09:14 09:15 09:27 09:27 09:27 09:31 09:40 09:39 09:33 09:30 09:30 09:36 09:52 09:49 
Arr. at D 09:22 09:23 09:23 09:34 09:34 09:34 09:38 09:47 09:47 09:40 09:36 09:36 09:43 09:58 09:55 
Dep. at D 09:24 09:25 09:25 09:37 09:37 09:37 09:41 09:50 09:50 09:43 09:39 09:39 09:46 09:61 09:58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time  
Distance  
Time  
Distance  
